After the First Opium War (1839-1842), British and American merchants negotiated with Chinese officials in Shanghai to work out the framework of the new treaty port regime. One key player in these negotiations was Wu Jianzhang, a Cantonese merchant who became circuit intendant of the Shanghai region. Wu, however, also had links to Cantonese sailors and antiQing secret societies. When the Small Swords Society took Shanghai in 1853, he found himself entangled in conflicting responsibilities and networks. Foreign traders and Chinese officials regarded Wu, like other middlemen on the Chinese coast, with a mixture of respect and distrust. Wu's situation, however, was not unique to the mid-nineteenth century. This article compares Wu to other intermediaries who played similar roles in the sixteenth and late nineteenth centuries, in order to show the ways in which Wu, his predecessors, and those who followed in his footsteps connected China to the wider world by navigating the treacherous waters of diplomacy, war, and commerce. The work of John K. Fairbank, who in the 1950s pioneered the study of such people as Wu Jianzhang, can find new meaning in the twenty-first century, enabling us to understand the transnational implications of China's local social history.
Introduction
Wu Jianzhang (ca. 1810-1865), a Cantonese merchant who served as the daotai 道台 fellow Cantonese, Liu Lichuan, with whom he had worked in business. When the Taiping threatened Shanghai, Wu tried to recruit Liu's militiamen to defend the city. In 1853, the Small Swords Society, a branch of the Triad secret society, staged an uprising and occupied Shanghai from 1853 to 1855. After the Qing recovered the city, Wu continued to wield influence in Shanghai through the 1850s.
Wu was clearly a man involved in many networks at different levels of society, and he interacted with a diverse group of individuals, including foreigners, his fellow Cantonese, rebels against the Qing, and local officials. How was he able to connect so many diverse groups, and how did he juggle their competing interests? As his impeachment shows, his position was never secure: a sudden change in the power of one faction could damage his status and wreck his plans.
But the fact that he managed to stay in an expectant or regular post of circuit intendant for nearly a decade demonstrates his value to his patrons. the uprising rooted in anti-tax resistance movements in the countryside around Shanghai, primarily motivated by resistance to Qing tax collectors (Perry 1985) . Wu himself appears first as a figure trying to mobilize militia forces to put down the Small Swords and raise funds from his contacts among the merchant guilds of the city. He failed, however, because his militia forces deserted to the Small Swords, forcing him to take refuge in the International Settlement.
Foreigners viewed Wu from the outside, as a duplicitous but influential figure determined to limit their access to the Chinese market. The Beijing court came to see Wu as an untrustworthy agent of foreign powers, too closely allied with commercial interests to be a loyal official. Wu at first attracted the loyalty of Cantonese and Fujianese braves, who were willing to fight under his banner to defend Shanghai, but the Small Swords leaders eventually came to see him as a hostile representative of the Qing administration. Each of these perspectives reveals only one face of this multifaceted man. The man in between is always vulnerable to attack from many sides. Can we discover the "real" Wu Jianzhang in the midst of this welter of conflicting interpretations?
We can view Wu as foreigners did, from the outside in, or as the upper bureaucracy saw him, from the top down, or from the social historians' lower depths looking up, but what if we view him from the middle, in his own terms? In this light, Wu belongs not only to the modern age of treaty ports, but also to a longer lineage of Chinese coastal merchant-officials who wove complex chains of intrigue, smuggling, militia organization, and official responsibility, going back at least to the Ming dynasty. If we place Wu Jianzhang in this Chinese lineage, we can provide a more local view of his activities that goes beyond accusations of mere corruption, selfseeking opportunism, or treason.
Ever since the late Ming dynasty, prominent Chinese of the southern coast had drawn on networks linking local society and foreign trade to engage in complex maneuvers of diplomacy, commerce, and war. After the mid-nineteenth century, other Chinese men obtained Western educations and continued this tradition of brokerage and mediation, trying to serve Chinese official, national, and foreign interests. They prospered because of their unusual skills at cultural brokerage, for a while. But they also found themselves in vulnerable positions, suspected by all sides of deception, disloyalty, and intrigue. As the consummate shapeshifters in the eyes of others, never considered completely trustworthy by anyone, they epitomize the dilemmas of many Chinese in the globalizing world of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
Many large-scale overviews of global history give us a grand view of abstract processes shared by many parts of the world. They provide less information about the individuals whose actions made globalization happen (Rosenberg 2012; Iriye 2014; Osterhammel 2014) . Ignoring quirky individuals, famous and obscure, makes globalization look like an inevitable linear process driven by irresistible economic and geopolitical forces. This perspective risks repeating the errors of the determinist, teleological Marxism that plagued historical study in the Maoist era.
We need to recapture the contingency of historical change by linking local history to global developments. Biographies on a global scale, such as the works of Timothy Brook (2008) , Natalie Z. Davis (2006), and John Wills (2001) , represent one effective way to do this. The conclusion to this article develops some of the implications of this biographical approach for the global history of China.
The Question of Wu
Wu Jianzhang came from Xiangshan, in Guangdong, and was a member of the Samqua hong merchant firm. He purchased the jiansheng examination degree and became acting intendant of the SuSongTai circuit in 1843. He became active in Shanghai by 1848 and took charge of foreign relations as superintendent of customs at Shanghai in 1851 (Hummel 1943 (Hummel -1944 . Over the next two years, he clashed with the British over several trade issues, mainly because the British felt that he had not fairly enforced the collection of the tariff set by the treaties ending the Opium War. As described above, he fled to the International Settlement Sir Rutherford Alcock blocked the movement of 4,000 junks bringing grain tribute shipments to the capital in order to enforce his demand for compensation. Local officials resisted paying anything to the British, but when Wu arrived in Shanghai in 1848, he was able to arrange for the release of the grain tribute boats after the governor-general approved compensation (Fairbank 1969, 395; Chouban yiwu shimo 1979, 2.30b; Bergère 2009, 19 ).
Until the 1850s, then, Wu succeeded in serving the court in its efforts to tax the Shanghai trade while also keeping foreign activities under control. The foreign merchants paid him With reference to this individual I have advised Mr. Alcock that, in my opinion, it would be imprudent to permit him again to take refuge in the Foreign settlement, for so long as he is suffered to reside under foreign protection, and there to concoct his schemes against the rebels, it cannot be affirmed that the British authorities are observing the strict neutrality which it is so desirable they should maintain, while his residence in the settlement might furnish the rebels with a plausible pretext for making a forcible entry into it for the purpose of capturing him. (Foreign Office, FO 176 17/205, 29) The Americans, however, gave him shelter in their compound until Wu left the city to organize resistance. Soon the Small Swords lost control of the countryside. Zhou Lichun was executed, but the rebels held out in the walled city of Shanghai (figure 1). They plundered the yamen treasury and confiscated wealth from rich residents of the city to support their army against siege by imperial troops. Liu Lichuan tried to negotiate a surrender of the city to Wu Jianzhang, but others resisted Liu's peace offers. He was able to escape back to his home in Guangdong after the city fell to imperial forces on February 17, 1855 (Meadows [1856 (Meadows [ ] 1953 . for an alliance with the Taiping in Nanjing. Although Liu's main ideology rested on restoring the Ming dynasty, not on any version of Christian beliefs, he was perfectly willing to draw in Christian Taiping and Western missionaries alike.
The Small Swords mobilization arose from the impact of treaty ports on the countryside of the lower Yangzi and southeast China. Such tax resistance movements originated in cashcropping districts near Shanghai: opium smugglers, merchant guilds, and foreign ideas supported the Small Swords (Perry 1985) . In this tangle of events, all of the parties had complex connections with one another. Now the very traits that had made Wu useful to the court earlier-his knowledge of English, his business acumen, and his ability to mobilize militia-were turned against him. His accusers argued that he used his intimate acquaintance with foreigners not to keep them out of the China trade, but to go into business with them for his own benefit. He had not collected customs revenues for defense purposes, but to line his own pockets. He recruited militiamen and bought ships for a defense fleet, but the militiamen became rebels, and Wu diverted funds from the yamen treasury to support the rebels. He gained the funds not from his private resources, but from illegally diverting customs revenues. The censor who impeached him concluded passionately: "We must have an upright official, either a neighboring provincial official or the governor-general, strictly investigate, to ensure that this evil traitor who colludes with foreigners does not escape justice" (Chouban yiwu shimo 1979, 8.17a ).
The emperor ordered Jiangsu governor Huang Zonghan to investigate the charges. Huang sent deputies to interrogate Wu and all the relevant parties, and he also consulted with gentry merchants in Zhejiang and Shanghai. In the end, he confirmed some of the charges, but he was unable to get reliable evidence on many others. Wu had done business with Liu and had recruited his militiamen, but the yamen treasury funds were stolen by Liu's men, not diverted into Wu's pockets. Wu had done business with the American firm, but so had many other merchant officials. Wu allowed American ships carrying sheets of lead to sail into Shanghai, but the investigator could not tell whether the lead was used for bullets or tea chests. He could not prove The circuit intendants stayed in their post only a short time, and they were not conspicuous in official biographies.
2 But they had much more influence on day-to-day practice in the treaty ports than their supervising officials. Wu himself stood out among daotai for his knowledge of English, and perhaps also some Portuguese; even knowing a little broken English put him ahead of all Chinese officials in Shanghai. Just as the daotai post itself expanded its responsibilities during the late nineteenth century, demonstrating the flexibility of the Qing bureaucracy, the men who occupied the position also exhibited adaptability, shifting their alliances and interests in response to changes in the world around them.
But the man in the middle never sits comfortably. One person's "flexibility and adaptability" is another person's opportunism and duplicity. Wu Jianzhang earned all sorts of epithets during the brief rise and fall of his career, both from contemporaries and from later historians. The moralistic tone has somehow never quite vanished, even today. Greed, opportunism, scheming, ruthlessness, hypocrisy, and deception are constant themes in the 
Predecessors and Legacies
Wu Jianzhang and the men in his network linking the worlds of China and the West did not appear de novo in the nineteenth century. They had an illustrious ancestry stretching back at least to the late Ming dynasty. In the late sixteenth century, defying the Ming prohibition on coastal trade, maritime confederations reaching from Japan to Southeast Asia employed coastal Chinese and others in large-scale trading enterprises. Ming officials denounced them as "dwarf [i.e., Japanese] pirates" (wokou 倭寇), but, in fact, the majority of these armed traders were Chinese (So 1975) . Ming officials opposed to maritime trade knew well that the coastal fleets had close connections with resident Chinese on land. These smugglers needed warehouses to store goods, sources of capital, and distribution networks to the interior. Enraged Ming officials singled out the evil gentry known as "harboring hosts" (wozhu 窝主) as the chief source of social decay in the southeast.
Lin Xiyuan: Gentry Pirate
These local gentry enthusiastically promoted maritime trade with all comers. They gained respect by bringing prosperity to their local communities and by establishing vital contacts with foreign traders. One of the most conspicuous of these harboring hosts was Lin Xiyuan (ca. 1480-ca. 1560). Born in Tong'an, Fujian, Lin obtained his jinshi degree in 1517 and became an important official serving in Nanjing. He came from a hereditary military family, so he was able to use his privileged status to accumulate not only official position but local power (Szonyi 2017) . When he was demoted to the remote post of a subprefectural magistrate on the border of Guangdong and Annam, he developed a great interest in affairs on the southern border (Goodrich and Fang 1976, 919; Perdue 2015) . After actively arguing for an attack on Vietnam when the Mac family usurped the throne, he was dismissed from office for his overly aggressive His greatest enemy was Zhu Wan (1494-1550), governor of Zhejiang, who was also responsible for policing the Fujian coast against pirate attacks (Goodrich and Fang 1976, 372-375; Higgins 1981) . Zhu discovered that many local gentry in Zhejiang and Fujian were financing illegal trade, collecting goods for distribution at the island of Shuangyugang near Ningbo. He attacked and destroyed the outpost at Shuangyugang, but he aroused so much local resentment that he generated enemies in the Ming court. They attacked Zhu and had him 
Interlopers in Global History
What can the cases of Wu Jianzhang, Lin Xiyuan, Wu Tingfang, and others tell us about the formation of the globally connected world in the modern era? Quite a few scholars have argued that we need to look beyond the boundaries of contemporary Asian states in order to grasp the dynamics of globalization, past and present (Wigen 1999; Wigen and Lewis 1999; Ludden 2003; Tagliacozzo, Perdue, and Siu 2015a, 2015b) . This new wave of scholarship examines processes, places, people, and commodities that cross the boundaries of nation-states and empire, and it aims to reconceive traditional spatial divisions of Asia with new concepts such as the Southeast Asian Mediterranean, Zomia, seas, or archipelagoes (Reid 1988; Wong 2004; Scott 2009; Amrith 2013 ).
Proponents of transnational history also argue for the study of actors and institutions that cross national boundaries. As mentioned above, biographies of individuals who traveled the Fairbank also described Wu Jianzhang's contribution to the new system of customs duties collection in Shanghai. As he put it, "The Foreign Inspectorate might not have been created if [Wu Jianzhang] had not been capable of the most unscrupulous knavery" (Fairbank 1969, 439 ).
Fairbank describes Wu as "duplicitous," a "wily rogue who had grown up in the Canton trade rather than with the Confucian classics" (Fairbank 1978, 242) Khan 2015) . In this sense, Fairbank pointed the way to developing one of the main themes emphasized by the new transnational history: the study of "mid-level" actors who shaped foreign and commercial relations (Iriye 2013; Saunier 2013 ).
To be sure, Fairbank's perspective, with its focus on "China's response to the West," came under critique for being too one-sided and too elitist. It mainly emphasized high-level Chinese officials and intellectuals who encountered Western diplomats and traders at the treaty ports. The social history turn of the 1980s focused attention more closely on the rural roots of rebellion, tending to stress domestic sources of rebellion. The case of the Small Swords, however, shows that rebels in regions like Jiangnan had significant ties with foreign agents. Now it is time to link the contributions of social history, with its stress on the local, to our revived recognition of the role of the global and transnational in directing modern Chinese history.
What did it take to succeed in these bewildering times and places? Men who adroitly managed this precarious balancing act needed the support of a three-legged stool: connections to officialdom, links to foreign patrons, and roots in local society. Certain global moments allowed them to rise to positions of importance, but the force field that supported them could shift at any moment. No single leg was stable by itself, and the three supports held each other in tension.
Higher officials might at one time endorse, or at least tolerate, foreign contacts, but they could easily turn against slick negotiators tainted by foreign influence. The useful intermediary could turn into a traitor at a moment's notice. Local people might profit from the brokers who gave them useful links to the bureaucracy and foreign trade, but they could just as easily strike out on their own, pursuing their interests through anti-official collective action or underground smuggling. Foreigners found these people useful, but baffling, and they never really shook off racial prejudices against Chinese who took on foreign ways. Yet, time and again, ambitious, multitalented Chinese men, and later women, have undertaken to connect local Chinese with higher officialdom and the equally promising but dangerous maritime world. They deserve our respect, insight, and careful study. 
Notes

1
Many scholars have studied the foreign and hong merchants in Canton, but we have little information on those who moved to Shanghai. Major works on the Canton trade include Cheong (1997) , Downs (1997) , and Van Dyke (2005 , 2016 .) 2
The Harvard China Biographical Database Project of 360,000 biographies contains only one short entry about Wu Jianzhang (http://isites.harvard.edu/icb/icb.do?keyword=k16229).
